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SO: This is Dr Sue Onslow talking to Mr Keith Somerville at Senate House on 
Wednesday, 23 January 2013. Keith, thank you very much indeed for 
agreeing to talk to me.  I wonder if you could begin, please, by speaking 
about how you came to work at the BBC. I know that you had 
established an interest in Southern Africa as a schoolboy and as an 
undergraduate. You’d also hoped to pursue a PhD in theory and 
practice of Soviet involvement in Africa liberation movements. But how 
did you then make the transition to the BBC? 
 
KS: The Monitoring Service then was very much an organisation that was both 
news gathering for the BBC and also a source of, what you could call, bulk 
political, economic and sometimes even military information for the 
government. So it was part funded by the BBC and part funded by the 
Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. At the time they were looking very 
much in 1980 in Cold War terms at ‘who do we need to monitor?’ So they 
were monitoring Soviet broadcasts - obviously Soviet domestic broadcasts in 
Russian, but also Soviet broadcasts in a variety of languages around the 
world. Part of the reason was to get information whether it was economic 
projects, what they’re saying about their own economy, but particularly also 
propaganda lines. ‘What is the Soviet Union saying currently about the 
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situation in Southern Africa?’ ‘Can we deduce from this, lines of policy?’ ‘Does 
what they say actually relate to what we hope they think or we think they 
think?’ And so they wanted people to monitor at that time particularly Soviet 
broadcasts to Asia, Africa and also to Europe and North America. With my 
interest in Soviet theory and Soviet practice of supporting national liberation 
movements in Southern Africa, as soon as I saw this advert I thought that’s 
something actually that I could do, that it would further my research, be very 
interesting and I get paid for it. I tried and I think my lucky combination of 
factors meant that I was the ideal sort of person they were looking for. I 
couldn’t speak Russian but I could read it but then would be monitoring 
anyway in English. From my research I had a good knowledge of Soviet 
sources and the current Soviet propaganda line and the current Soviet 
ideological approach to Southern Africa and to Africa as a whole. Therefore I 
would be able to spot what they wanted to spot, not just in order to inform 
BBC news gathering but also for their official clients, Foreign Office, MoD. I 
could spot changes in emphasis. 
 
SO: But was the BBC, through its Monitoring Service, providing information 
through other British intelligence networks for the CIA, for the American 
government? In other words could the Americans profit from BBC 
Monitoring Services across Southern Africa? 
 
KS: Absolutely. The deal was the Monitoring Service was this funny hybrid 
organisation. It was BBC, you worked for the BBC, but the Monitoring Service 
also, and very openly - they made no bones about it - worked for the 
government and through working for the government the Ministry of Defence; 
obviously intelligence service looked at the output, work very closely and 
there was an open agreement with what was then called the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service which was an open source arm as they called 
it, of the CIA. The top floor at Caversham was off limits to BBC people; it was 
FBIS, it was effectively part of the CIA and we divided up the world between 
us. So at that time in 1980 the BBC was responsible for, I think, practically all 
monitoring in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa. So we had a base 
in Nairobi, which we still have, monitoring East African unit which monitored 
the Horn of Africa, East Africa and bits of Central Africa; and then the base 
that I worked at for a period in Lilongwe in Malawi, based in the British High 
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Commission and we monitored South African domestic and external 
broadcasts. 
 
SO: In English. 
 
KS: In English. Zimbabwean broadcasts in English, Malawian, Zambian, 
Botswana. By the time I went there it was Zimbabwe, but when it was 
originally set up it was monitoring Rhodesia. In fact I think that was one of the 
primary reasons it was set up - to monitor Rhodesian radio and to monitor 
also South African radio. Interestingly at that stage bits of South African radio 
would be directly re-broadcast by the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation. 
For a while there was a BBC base in Francistown which both monitored and 
allegedly jammed, though the British government is still a little unclear on 
whether it did that but also re-broadcast British broadcasts made specifically 
to be broadcast into Rhodesia. 
 
SO: The files at BBC Caversham are explicit that the Francistown transmitter 
was put there to jam and also to beam in a particular line into Rhodesia, 
to try to simulate opposition to the Rhodesia Front government. 
 
KS: Exactly. But the monitoring was very much to find out what was being said. 
You would find out very important news information, things that change. So 
for example when I was there I was monitoring around the period in early 
1982 when Mugabe and Nkomo fell out and there were all the arms finds, 
secret ZAPU arms caches which were found both around what was still 
Salisbury, but also around Bulawayo and areas of Matabeleland and I 
monitored the first references. There was a press conference and I monitored 
it live; apart from obviously reporters who were there, I actually got it back to 
Bush House via Monitoring to get it out on the air before anybody else. So I 
monitored it and was recording it the same time and I was dotting in and out 
of the recording. 
 
That was the sort of thing we did from there, monitoring radios for news, but 
also for very advanced political information. So when I applied for it I had the 
right background, I had a degree in international politics; I’d spent a year 
doing post-graduate research into Southern Africa and into the Soviet Union; 
I’d read Soviet journals like the Soviet version of International Affairs; I’d used 
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the summary of world broadcast the monitoring output, their transcripts of 
Moscow broadcasts to Southern Africa as part of my research. So when it 
came to the interview they said: “won’t you get bored going through all this 
stuff?”, I said: “No, I was doing it voluntarily for research”. I was still doing my 
research, I will now be paid to do my research! This sold it and I started 
working for them. Pretty quickly once they’d trained me up, I would say on a 
daily basis, I would monitor maybe a Soviet broadcast to Southern Africa, a 
couple of South African external broadcasts, Radio RSA beamed either at 
West Africa or Europe and North America because we could pick up the 
signals perfectly at Caversham there. Lagos Radio, Accra Radio, then also 
Islamabad Radio, Delhi Radio and Kabul in English. 
 
SO: How big was the BBC Monitoring office in Lilongwe? 
 
KS: Oh no, I’m trying think how many English monitors there were. There must’ve 
been about 15 to 20 of us in Caversham; in Lilongwe there were only two 
people, and we did shifts. So you would perhaps do an early morning shift 
starting at seven and going through to early afternoon. There would be a 
couple of cross shifts starting at lunchtime going through to early evening and 
then a night shift. Well, it wasn’t a full night shift, a shift that maybe started at 
six o’clock in the evening and went through to two or three in the morning; 
and then anything between three in the morning and seven in the morning 
was recorded. The day team took the recordings on the basis that most of the 
things we were monitoring were in a time zone pattern. We weren’t 
monitoring, for example, any sources from North America and the Moscow for 
North America we could do their early broadcasts late at night and then the 
day team would do the recordings in the early hours of the morning. 
 
SO: Were you doing information gathering and reporting, rather than first 
stage analysis of what you’re hearing? 
 
KS: You would analyse because we listened to so much that you had to select; 
we didn’t just transcribe everything. So we would transcribe, we would listen 
and decide what was newsworthy and that we would transcribe very quickly 
and that would then be transmitted, then by teleprinter, straight to Bush 
House and other BBC news gathering departments and that would also go to 
the Foreign Office as a very quick news briefing on what was going on, what 
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was being said on foreign radio stations. But also we would then choose what 
should we transcribe in full. Is there, for example, a particular commentary on 
Radio Moscow for Southern Africa that indicates perhaps a new line on 
something? Has the line, for example, known that we were closely watching 
what they said about Zimbabwe because, of course, when Mugabe came to 
power he was no friend of the Soviet Union. In fact when I went to Zimbabwe 
in 1982 for the first time after my spell monitoring in Lilongwe and interviewed 
a number of senior ZAPU and ZANU figures including one of the vice 
presidents and various other people who’d led ZAPU’s guerrilla army or the 
political commissars within the Army. They hated the Soviet Union at that 
stage because the Soviet Union had refused to support them because 
Moscow had supported ZAPU. The Soviet Union had this group of what were 
known as the ‘Authentics’, the group of movements in Southern Africa: ANC, 
SWAPO, ZAPU, MPLA, FRELIMO who they supported. ZANU was viewed as 
a ‘split-ists’ pro-Chinese, revisionist group, so wouldn’t be supported by the 
Soviet Union. Consequently, Mugabe hated them and so anything the Soviet 
Union said about Zimbabwe at the time was keenly watched. Are they moving 
closer?  Are they trying to make friends? Which they were because they 
suddenly realised they’d backed the wrong horse and particularly once 
Nkomo was kicked out of government after the arms finds the Soviet Union 
then had to make friends with Mugabe if it wanted to stay there. 
 
SO: Yes, because they weren’t able to open their embassy in Harare until 
‘82/’83. 
 
KS: That’s right. In fact Mugabe never became particularly close to the Soviet 
Union; he still remained much closer to China and to North Korea because 
North Korea, of course, trained the appalling Fifth Brigade. So we were 
looking for things like that. We were also looking obviously for Soviet reaction 
to developing events. So while I was out in Lilongwe obviously my colleagues 
were back in London. I was monitoring the Zimbabwe angle when Nkomo 
was sacked but in London they were monitoring carefully Soviet reaction to 
his sacking because he was their ally in the government. 
 
SO: Keith, just to step back a little bit. You mentioned that there was a 
Nairobi office for BBC Monitoring, there was the Lilongwe office; but 
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that you could still cover Radio Lagos.  But was there a West African 
Monitoring service? 
 
KS: That very soon developed in the early ‘80s. I couldn’t tell you exactly which 
year it started, but that was the Americans. So as FBIS, the Foreign 
Broadcasting Information Service, they opened a base in Abijan where they 
monitored the whole of West Africa and then they opened a base in Kinshasa 
where they monitored West Central and West Southern Africa. So they took 
over monitoring, for example, of Namibia, Angola, obviously what was then 
Zaire, People’s Republic of Congo, right the way up to Cameroon, while 
Abijan would do the whole of West Africa in English and in French. Later on 
the Lilongwe base of the BBC closed down and the Americans opened up 
their base in Mbabane where they monitored the whole of Southern Africa. So 
they took over then everything apart from East and the Horn of Africa which 
remained monitored by the BBC in Nairobi and it was mainly because, as 
they could see things were beginning to change in Southern Africa, they 
wanted far more monitoring than the BBC could afford to do. 
 
SO: Keith, this sets the BBC Monitoring Service very squarely in the context 
of information gathering within the Cold War, but where was the BBC in 
the Commonwealth at this time? 
 
KS: The BBC was still very much an organisation which felt - and you can even 
see it now when you look at the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, 
many of the people at the top of it are former BBC people who were senior, 
Elizabeth Smith, Rita Payne, who were all with the BBC during the ‘80s and 
‘90s - I think behind it all, that the BBC had the same sort of ethical set of 
values that matched up with what the Commonwealth was seeking to do. Just 
the idea of the BBC’s ‘nation which would speak peace on to nation’ is very 
much the same sort of broad ethos, I would say, as the Commonwealth. I 
think there was the feeling that the BBC had a huge audience in the 
Commonwealth, was still admired, respected, even if many governments 
were within the Commonwealth might have been suspicious of BBC output 
because it said things they didn’t perhaps want their own people to hear. 
They asked questions that their own journalists would not ask, yet still I 
always felt that there was very much a sort of empathy between the two 
organisations and that when I travelled for the BBC as a programme maker in 
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Africa and also in the Caribbean at one stage, there was this big recognition 
of the BBC as something that was part of their history and was part of their 
present; they might not always agree with what it said but they didn’t 
automatically equate the BBC directly with the British government because 
they would hear criticism of the British government on the BBC. This was not 
criticism I mean by the BBC, but it offered a full range of opinions. 
 
SO: So what you’re describing here is a sense among BBC employees, 
directors, programme makers, of a moral and ethical idea of the 
Commonwealth, a shared set of unspoken values, cultural empathy, but 
also a perception within the Commonwealth outside the UK of the BBC 
as their ‘friend’? 
 
KS: Yes and it created very interesting relationships. I mean people like Mark 
Tully, the great BBC reporter from India. He had a huge status in India. 
 
SO: He still does. 
 
KS: Still does. This status could turn round on him very quickly in bad ways in the 
way that one friend may turn on another when they think that friend has been 
disloyal to them. So poor Mark: I remember and I’m afraid I can’t remember 
the date, but I know the exact event, it was during the problems over the 
Ayodha temple, where there was the Muslim/Hindu dispute over the temple 
and whether a mosque could be built where Hindus said there used to be a 
temple. I was on the World Service the day that the second round of problems 
of Ayodha blew up and there was going to be a big march that day. I think it 
was a Sunday in Ayodha, Mark Tully was there to cover it. By then BBC 
World was broadcasting TV live to India and was received in India. As the 
march was about to take place, BBC World broadcast a report on it that was 
all absolutely factual, but they made one minor error. They showed film of a 
previous riot at Ayodha and they did not introduce it or flag it up with what are 
called ‘ASTONS’, the banners across the bottom that tell you ‘Ayodha 
disturbances in 1990’ or whatever or put ‘Library pictures’. When it was 
broadcast and seen in Ayodha people thought it was going on there and then. 
 
SO: They thought it was live? 
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KS: They thought it was live. It wasn’t deliberate BBC misinformation, it was a 
genuine error. Somebody forgot to put the thing in there, hurried to get it on 
air, saying ‘Library pictures’ or ‘Ayodha three years ago’, or whatever, and 
people came out on to the streets. 
 
SO: To respond to ‘the riots’. 
 
KS: To respond to the riots and poor Mark Tully! He wasn’t injured but he was 
severely harassed by people who thought ‘Here is a man we trust and yet his 
organisation is broadcasting this.’ It calmed down, but it was that sort of 
relationship. BBC was trusted. They saw it on the BBC. They came out on to 
the streets. They then saw it wasn’t happening. ‘Mark Tully what is going on? 
YOU are the BBC here.’ Because that was the other thing, when you travel 
for the BBC as a correspondent or as a resident correspondent, you became 
for people the BBC. 
 
SO: You had a status and an authority? 
 
KS: You had a status. Authority. Also people felt (a particular connection) because 
of the way that radio broadcasts work that in a way is far more intimate; you 
come into people’s homes in a way that a newspaper doesn’t. A newspaper is 
bought and brought into a home and read, but it’s not a voice, it’s not a 
person … or used for something even worse! … it is not a person, you 
couldn’t use the Daily Times in Malawi. 
 
SO: Because the print? 
 
KS: No, in case there was a picture of Ngwazi, the live president, Dr Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda, destroyer of the Central African Federation. If his picture was 
on the front page you’d never use that. Anyway, radio came into people’s 
homes and people became presenters, reporters, your friends. I remember, I 
think it was in Botswana, somebody said to me: “oh do you work with Pamela 
Creighton?” who was a newsreader at the World Service and had been for 
many, many years. “I love that lady. I have actually written to her and asked if 
she would marry me, she is such a friend to me and my life”. They did, people 
would write to presenters and do that sort of thing. They saw you as friends, it 
was very personal. 
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SO: So BBC was actually a type of diplomatic actor, an opinion maker, an 
opinion former? 
 
KS: Yes and it reflected an image of Britain that for many people was very, very 
positive. The BBC used to do lots and lots of surveys and it would come out 
that one of the first things that people (saw the BBC), particularly in 
Commonwealth countries because of the history, both of colonialism and then 
the decolonisation and of the World Service, if you like, taking over from the 
old Empire Service that becoming something that was no longer, if you like, a 
voice of empire, was a voice of a new world. 
 
SO: I love the World Service precisely because of that aspect. 
 
KS: They loved it. You would get questioned on ‘Why are you broadcasting this?’ 
or ‘We didn’t like that.’ You put your hands up and say: “Well, it wasn’t me! I 
don’t control everything in the BBC”. But they saw you as the embodiment of 
the BBC, and people would be very, very friendly. 
 
SO: Was it used as an integral part of Britain’s ‘soft power diplomacy’, to 
use a rather elaborate academic phrase? 
 
KS: I think in some more far sighted Foreign Secretaries did, but a lot didn’t. A lot 
didn’t quite understand, I think, the role that it played. Some did. Lord 
Carrington is one who did and, funnily enough, I was in Zimbabwe when Lord 
Carrington resigned as Foreign Secretary over the Falklands. 
 
SO: In April 1982. 
 
KS: Yes. I was in Zimbabwe and I remember interviewing Nathan Shamuyarira 
who was Information Minister at the time, and a senior ZANU government 
official, He had been a senior ZANU figure for many years, and was one of 
the intellectuals in the party. I remember interviewing him at his house in 
Harare and him saying, he said: “you know we had our problems with the 
Conservative government and we didn’t think they played fair at first. But in 
the end there were certain people we got to like. In our way we got to like 
Soames; he was a big jolly figure, you knew you could have fun with him. And 
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we liked Carrington and we respected him; we are very sad that he has had 
to go in this way”. But I think as financial pressures on the government, 
commercial pressures on the BBC as it began to think how was it going to 
cope with a new commercial world? Decisions were made where you began 
to think ‘The government doesn’t realise (the implications of) this.’   
 
SO: The BBC as part of a spider’s web of connections within the 
Commonwealth? 
 
KS: Yes, they don’t realise the image that this portrays of Britain abroad: the idea 
of a trusted friend that, okay, you may not say the British government is your 
trusted friend, but an important British institution is a trusted friend and it 
helps and it creates an image of Britain. One of the lesser stated mission 
statements of the World Service was always to promote Britain to the world 
and promote British business to the world and create this atmosphere of trust; 
and it worked very well. 
 
SO: Within that is promoting Britain to the Commonwealth. 
 
KS: Yes and because the Commonwealth made up such an important part of the 
audience, the audience particularly in English but also in Hindi, in Hausa, in 
Swahili, these were vital audiences for the BBC. 
 
SO: Was this acknowledged, managed, directed, in the preparation of the 
editorial line?  Was the Commonwealth an explicit, particular focus or 
was the BBC genuinely global in your time there? 
 
KS: I would say it was genuinely global, but within that you knew where your big 
audiences were and the biggest audiences were all in Commonwealth 
countries. You knew that and you did give quite a lot of prominence to 
Commonwealth affairs and officials of the Commonwealth - not I think for any 
direct propagandistic or political reasons - but because the countries you 
were broadcasting to which had the biggest audiences for you were part of 
the Commonwealth. Secretary General Anyaoku and others would give their 
time to the BBC. They saw it, I think, as an important organisation that 
through which they could get their voice across. They knew they might be 
given hard times on things, but they would come in and give interviews, they 
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would give time. I rather suspect, although you can never pin it down, that 
they would actually give priority to the World Service when they’re asked to 
give interviews. 
 
SO: Do you recall whether Sonny Ramphal also did that? 
 
KS: Yes.  I’m sure he did. 
 
SO: Don McKinnon? 
 
KS: Yes. 
 
SO: Okay, thank you. 
 
KS: The Eminent Persons’ Group relating to South Africa certainly did. I 
remember sitting talking to Michael Manley in Johannesburg in 1994 as the 
South African elections started. He was there as one of the representatives of 
the Eminent Persons’ Group. I was chatting to him just off the record and he 
said how important it was. He was very pleased to give interviews for the BBC 
even though they criticised his policies or aired criticisms and policies in 
Jamaica, he was happy to do it. I think because they felt that the real mission 
of the BBC was always to try and tell people information that enabled them to 
make choices for themselves and, of course, people coming from areas or 
dealing with areas like Manley as part of the Eminent Persons’ Group where 
they knew very well that right up to the end of Apartheid that South Africans 
were not being told by their own media what was going on. Something like the 
World Service was very important and although my personal belief is that all 
media organisations are in some way propagandising, the BBC if you think on 
a spectrum of propaganda is at the far soft, if you like, altruistic end and 
things like RTLM in Rwanda are at the opposite end. 
 
SO: Was the BBC then consciously influenced by the debate around the new 
International Information Order? Did the BBC help Commonwealth 
countries with their own broadcasting production? 
 
KS: We absolutely did that, but I think not in the conscious way that we were 
establishing a new International Information Order, but on the basis that this 
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was helping journalists, the media develop better standards of journalism was 
very much in the World Service remit, through the World Service Trust and it 
also worked by the way that the BBC took on so many journalists from 
Commonwealth countries. 
 
SO: Was there a deliberate link that you know of between the 
Commonwealth Journalists Association and the BBC? 
 
KS: Not necessarily a deliberate one, but certainly a lot of interplay. The BBC saw 
one of its tasks as the necessity to broadcast properly to Commonwealth 
countries; this required broadcasters, journalists from Commonwealth 
countries doing that broadcasting, not just a bunch of Brits who may have 
been very knowledgeable. If you looked at the African Service, for example, 
which I worked in for a while and worked closely with for many years, their 
key broadcasters were Commonwealth journalists. 
 
SO: How about particular editorial steers before CHOGM meetings, such as 
discussions at the BBC on how and what to report, where were the side 
issues? ‘Do we use particular Commonwealth journalists to, as you say, 
get the message out’?, which affected the presentation of BBC 
reporting? 
 
KS: We would always prepare very, very carefully for CHOGMs. I can remember 
particularly Mark Brayne who was one of the foreign correspondents and 
Barney Mason who covered them and we would have big briefings. We would 
give over editorial sessions because CHOGMS were so important to our 
audience, because our biggest audience by the ‘90s was Nigeria. The Indian 
audience, particularly for radio, was beginning to fall away as television took 
over in India, but it was still a very important audience. I wouldn’t down play it, 
but Nigeria had in English and in Hausa had the biggest audiences. Swahili 
was very important, as was broadcasting to other areas of West Africa in 
English - Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, as well as to Southern and Eastern 
Africa. So we knew we had audiences. We knew they wanted to hear about 
this and it wasn’t the matter of deciding, if you like, CHOGM is important 
because we have some link with it, but it’s important as a story to these 
people, to these very important, valued audiences. So we’ve got to cover it 
very well and we’ve got to think not just about ‘OK, what are the important 
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British angles?’ Obviously we would reflect that, we would interview 
government ministers, commentators on what Britain wanted out of this 
meeting, but we would also be looking at what Commonwealth members 
wanted out of the meeting. We’d regularly do things on what does the 
Commonwealth stand for? - and we would do it very critically, but we always 
felt fairly and we always got the impression that the Commonwealth 
appreciated this because it also gave this idea of an organisation that was 
collegiate. That wasn’t led from the top, now, still as it had been during empire 
days, (the era of) the Dominions and the Commonwealth led by Britain. By 
the ‘80s/’90s it was very collegiate. Britain certainly in the late ‘80s was on the 
back foot, I felt, in the Commonwealth over Southern Africa and we would 
reflect that. But we would talk about ‘who do we want to interview? Who are 
the key players?’ Who had particular things to say either about a particular 
crisis or about what role the Commonwealth has in the world now. 
 
SO: So, for instance, there was BBC World coverage of the Harare CHOGM 
meeting 1991 from which emerged the Harare Declaration? 
 
KS: Yes. 
 
SO: The Ken Saro Wiwa crisis and his execution in Nigeria which took place 
at the same time as CHOGM was being held in Auckland in 1995? 
 
KS: I remember that very well because I was the presenter of the special 
broadcast that we put on the live hour broadcast to purely cover the execution 
of Ken Saro Wiwa. I knew him, I’d interviewed him in London, I knew 
members of his family and because of that partly and because of my Africa 
expertise, as soon as the news of the execution came out we decided to put 
on a special programme. I was then, I think editor of what used to be called 
Radio Newsreel and then changed to News Desk and is now called World 
Briefing; and although I was the editor because I had the expertise on this 
subject, I presented the programme and interviewed people in Nigeria. I 
interviewed our correspondents, interviewed campaigners for Ogoni rights 
here and discussed the whole issue. Why had he been executed? What were 
the issues surrounding MOSOP and the Delta, and what was the wider 
reaction including within the Commonwealth? Things like that were vitally 
important and the importance of Commonwealth action on things like that 
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were equally so. Other such instances were the suspension of countries from 
the Commonwealth, Zimbabwe was suspended. 
 
SO: In 2003, yes. 
 
KS: Yes. These were very, very important issues. I don’t think there was ever a 
conscious thing of ‘Commonwealth, Commonwealth, Commonwealth. We 
must cover the Commonwealth.’  But it was just part of our being, it was our 
audience. 
 
SO: Part of your remit? Part of the BBC’s DNA? 
 
KS: Yes, part of the DNA. Unsaid, unspoken. Certainly I did because of my 
interest in Africa I’d also made programmes in the Caribbean where again 
there was a huge interest, because as I’ve said, Michael Manley being an 
important Commonwealth leader. There was a huge interest in and a feeling 
that the Commonwealth could work for them and therefore I don’t think we 
ever really thought, ‘Yes we’ve got to cover this because it’s the 
Commonwealth.’ We would cover this because it’s important, but we felt that 
the Commonwealth had a role. 
 
SO: Would there be debriefings after CHOGM meetings? 
 
KS: Oh absolutely. Absolutely, after every major piece of coverage, whether it was 
a Davos, a CHOGM, any sort of major event, senior editors would get 
together and discuss how we’d covered it, have we got the right angles? Had 
we been critical enough? Was there a feeling we’d maybe given somebody 
an easy ride, given somebody else a hard ride? That would all be picked 
apart. We picked apart after individual programmes as well, feedback after a 
programme. How did you do that interview? Why did you ask that question?  
Do you think that worked? Between those two people did you give one a 
harder time than the other? There was this constant looking in on ourselves, 
are we doing this correctly? 
 
SO: BBC monitoring! 
 
KS: Well, BBC monitoring itself within the organisation. 
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SO: In best practice terms. 
 
KS: Yes. 
 
SO: So was HMG conscious of what the BBC was doing in its professional 
coverage and assessment of its coverage on individual CHOGMs? 
 
KS: Yes. 
 
SO: Did that information go to the Foreign Office or was there any cross 
fertilisation between Whitehall and the BBC? 
 
KS: There were lots and lots of contacts. We would be invited regularly as 
programme editors, say, to Foreign Office seminars on key events, whether 
related to the Commonwealth ones. I remember going to a couple on 
Southern Africa which both had a slight Cold War angle still, and then after 
the fall of the Soviet Union to one or two meetings where it was ‘Okay, how 
do we look at Southern Africa after the Cold War?’ The BBC were seen as 
having expertise and input. We also got periodically the sort of feed-back, it 
reminds me slightly of ‘Yes Minister’ and more so - though perhaps without 
the swearing - The Thick of It, when governments felt we weren’t covering 
things the way they wanted to. 
 
SO: Well, you do know that ‘Yes Minister’ is a training manual? 
 
KS: Yes, I’m sure! I can remember just after the Blair government took power and 
although this didn’t have a very specific Commonwealth angle it related to 
aspects of British government, wider foreign policy in certain areas of the 
world when the Labour Party in opposition had been espousing very strongly 
the idea of an ethical foreign policy. Labour came into power and was 
immediately confronted with a very serious issue and that was the question of 
arms sales to Indonesia. 
 
SO: When Robin Cook was Foreign Secretary. 
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KS: This was the time when East Timor was still high on the agenda for 
Commonwealth countries, particularly like Australia. 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
KS: Who perhaps had a different view point to Britain at the time.  We interviewed 
Robin Cook about the ethical arms policy; we didn’t feel he did a particularly 
good interview. We interviewed him, I think as we often do, with recorded 
interviews at some length and we only broadcast about three minutes of it 
which was quite average actually. They didn’t quite realise this, the way that 
interviews went that you’d do a lot and you would never do the whole 
broadcast even for a British Foreign Secretary or it had been the Prime 
Minister or the Prime Minister or President of another country, we rarely put 
something out at a length of 10 minutes. It went out at three minutes. It had 
been, I think, faithfully edited. Within minutes of it going on air, Alistair 
Campbell’s office was on to the BBC World Service. I think it went through to 
the senior duty editor of the news room at the time, not quite Malcolm 
Tuckerish in The Thick of It, but very angry: ‘How dare you! We gave you the 
new Foreign Secretary’s time and this is what you did.’ It wasn’t even so 
much about the content; it was then length of time, it was a status thing I 
think. 
 
SO: Oh I see! Only giving him three minutes was seen as disrespectful? 
 
KS: Disrespectful. ‘We gave you this, he’s a new Foreign Secretary with a new 
reforming government, how dare you!’ 
 
SO: We have declared our ethical foreign policy and look what you do!  
  
KS: Other times when I was working in the African Service - it was sometime 
between January and March in 1987 and I was working as a talks writer. I 
was actually replacing for a period Martin Plaut who was in Ethiopia gathering 
material for a programme and we were writing talks to broadcast both in 
English but also for translation into Hausa, Somali, Swahili, French, 
Portuguese, so broadcasting to Africa. At the time the BBC didn’t censor 
itself, but it became very, very sensitive about whatever we said about 
President Siad Barre in Somalia. He was beginning to come under pressure 
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and it was only a couple of years before he was finally overthrown. He was at 
the time, in Cold War terms, a British ally in what was known as ‘the arc of 
crisis’ stretching down through the Middle East, through People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen into the Horn of Africa. Siad Barre had jumped ship from 
on the Soviet side when the Soviets started making up to Menghistu in 
Ethiopia and Siad Barre was part of US and British policy in containing 
communism and Marxism in the Horn and East Africa. The British 
government became very, very sensitive about anything that was being said 
about Somalia and anything that was being broadcast particularly by the 
World Service and the BBC Somali Service and the BBC Swahili Service that 
could be seen as weakening Siad Barre. They got in touch with the BBC 
World Service and were putting pressure on saying ‘Be careful what you say.’ 
Now the reaction of the BBC World Service was not to say ‘yes sir, no sir, 
three bags full, Sir.‘ But it was just to be very careful. Maybe it was partly 
because I was only temporarily at the World Service from monitoring, but I 
was aware that every talk that I wrote, normally everything is read by, seen by 
a second pair of eyes before it goes out or it was in those days, less so now 
because of staff cuts, I fear. But if I wrote a talk, either my colleague Pete 
Murray or perhaps somebody else in the African Service would read it before 
it went out or before it was translated. At that stage George Bennett was head 
of the African Service and he was carefully looking over what went out. Now 
at no stage did he ever censor things, but there was much more careful 
checking to make absolutely sure there was nowhere the British government 
to say: “you got that wrong” and to put further pressure on. But I was aware at 
that stage that there was British government pressure on the World Service to 
be very careful what it said about Somalia because they didn’t want an ally 
weakened. 
 
SO: So here we’ve got a case of the British government not seeing the BBC 
as a useful tool for communication. This is Her Majesty’s Government 
concerned that the BBC shouldn’t be a blunt instrument against its own 
policy. 
 
KS: Yes, or that something could be said that could undermine or backfire and 
could actually turn out to be wrong. The BBC could absolutely maintain its 
independence by being accurate and making sure everything is said could be 
stood up. A bit like the Gilligan affair. I was heavily involved in running training 
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courses for BBC journalists after the Gilligan affair. I co-wrote the course that 
all BBC journalists did on how not to make the mistakes that Andrew Gilligan 
made; and Gilligan did make mistakes. His report, I would say, was 98 per 
cent correct but he embroidered a tiny little bit and when the Blair 
Government got angry about what he said about government claims about 
weapons of mass destruction and the evidence on which it was based the 
BBC handled it badly. Instead of saying ‘We were right, but yes, in this little 
area we made a mistake.’ 
 
SO: The two per cent? 
 
KS: And the two per cent that was wrong was building up the link between 10 
Downing Street and strongly implying that changes in the dossier - the 
famous dossier on weapons of mass destruction - had been dictated by No. 
10 and in the way that David Kelly, the poor scientific advisor to the 
intelligence community, was described. He was an anonymous source and as 
a journalist you will do everything to protect an anonymous source. Yet on the 
other hand, you must be fair to your audience and give them an indication of 
the level of importance of the source you’re quoting. 
 
SO: Because of the quality of the information? 
 
KS: The quality of the information. Andrew Gilligan slightly over-exaggerated 
Kelly’s importance by describing him as a senior intelligence official instead of 
a scientific advisor to the intelligence committee. And you may think it’s a 
minor error, but this is where the BBC went wrong. If they put their hands up 
and said yes okay there could’ve been a greater precision in the description 
of this person and perhaps a little more caution about how the dossier was 
drawn up, it would’ve still been an incredibly powerful story. But the BBC 
would not have laid itself open to the accusations that it embroidered, as they 
said, ‘over-sexed’ the report and then of course whatever happened, and I 
can’t judge or not on how Kelly’s name came out and who was entirely to 
blame for that, but the BBC made mistakes. What the BBC also did and this 
was very clear to me when I was constructing this post-Gilligan course for 
BBC journalists, is it broke its own rules. I was thoroughly aware of these 
having been the senior editor of the World Service, and how you responded 
to complaints. You responded to complaints by investigating in detail and then 
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replying in detail, not as it was decided when Alistair Campbell sent in his 10 
points, I think it was, of what the government felt was wrong with this report 
that without initially doing a thorough investigation saying no we were 
absolutely right. My feeling at the time, and I’m prepared to say this on record, 
is that Greg Dyke and Gavin Davies decided that because of criticism when 
they were appointed to their posts that they were too close to new Labour. 
They needed an issue on which they put some clear blue sky between them 
and new Labour and so they decided we will fight the government over this; 
we will not admit an error, because then when they actually investigated it 
there were errors and then, although I think the Hutton inquiry rather unfairly 
criticised the BBC in some ways or inaccurately criticised it, by not coming 
clean about the relatively small areas of error in the reporting, the BBC left it 
open to criticism. 
 
SO: Keith, going back to the 1980s on Commonwealth issues and 
Commonwealth crises: you had been in BBC Monitoring for nine 
months and you then returned here to London. Were you involved in 
any of the reporting around the Grenada invasion of ’83? 
 
KS: Yes, I was involved in monitoring things. I seem to remember coming in the 
morning after it happened and we were immediately getting reports from this 
new radio station purportedly an independent one called, I think, Radio Spice 
Islands which was American, very much like Radio Marty and other radio 
stations put out under the auspices of the CIA to broadcast disinformation and 
propaganda to Central America. This was a new one that suddenly sprang up 
overnight broadcasting to Grenada and the Caribbean. Yes, I’m sure there 
are transcripts available. 
 
 We also got the impression - I never had any direct contacts with government 
officials or the Foreign Office - but we would get Foreign Office requests into 
Monitoring to look out for particular types of material. I would say I got the 
impression at about third hand that the British government - put in no other 
way and I’m sure this is the way Thatcher would’ve put it - was bloody furious 
about this, about the invasion and about suddenly setting up this radio station 
that was broadcasting very crass propaganda to the Caribbean. 
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SO: So you were monitoring, you were not involved in any programme 
production, any news? 
 
KS: No, actually I wasn’t directly monitoring, I was then one of the editors. I was 
one of the deputy heads by then of the production team that put out what was 
Part Four of the Summary of World Broadcasts that covered Africa, Middle 
East, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and Latin America. So the Latin America 
stuff we were putting out anything to do with the Caribbean. We didn’t do a 
huge amount on the Caribbean, but we would put out things, for example, 
from Cuba and we put out radio broadcasts from the region about the 
invasion of Grenada and about the coup there. 
 
SO: So the BBC would then have been part of the information going into the 
British government. Do you recall, again, connections between 
Whitehall and the BBC on this at all? 
 
KS: Absolutely because there were regular communications. I mean it was very, 
very clear. We all had to sign the Official Secrets Act when we joined 
Monitoring which you didn’t necessarily in the rest of the BBC because we 
would deal directly with people. So yes, we would get requests that we knew 
came in from the Foreign Office or even Ministry of Defence about particular 
issues.  ‘Look out for this.’ I can remember at one stage getting requests that I 
think actually came more from the Americans but also from the Foreign 
Office, possibly the Cabinet Office, which tended to be, I think, the link 
between Monitoring and the intelligence services looking out for timing 
Gaddafi speeches. 
 
 Now I always got the impression again and in off the record discussions 
although this is on the record here, I had with the FBIS people and Monitoring 
that some people in the CIA had this theory that Gaddafi’s more outrageous 
outbursts tended to coincide with phases of the moon. I’m serious. 
 
SO: He was a genuine lunatic? 
 
KS: Yes. They looked at all sorts of different things because he would veer widely. 
So we would get contacts about that. This was one thing very directly we did 
at the request of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office, so of course 
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BBC news gathering was interested and I did it myself, just after I came back 
from Lilongwe. I was in Lilongwe when the Argentineans invaded the Falkland 
Islands. I got back just after that; I’d been in Zimbabwe and talked, as I 
mentioned, to Nathan Shamuyarira and the Foreign Minister, Witness 
Mangwende about the Falklands and Carrington having to step down to 
resign. When I came back one of my jobs throughout the period of the British 
re-in vasion, re-occupation, liberation, however you put it, of the Falklands, I 
monitored Argentine Radio Liberty which was the Argentine propaganda 
station broadcasting at the British task force. We were asked directly to do 
that by the British government and it was useful for the BBC, but actually we 
didn’t get a huge amount of it. I’m quite surprised because I’m sure they 
must’ve been monitoring it onboard the ships, but maybe they just wanted a 
back up because it wasn’t in particularly quality. You had to really struggle to 
listen, but we would pick up the most amazing propaganda. I mean Admiral 
Sandy Woodward committed suicide about five times and they sank an 
aircraft carrier repeatedly! It reminded me actually of something I read in the 
account of Goebbels daily meetings of his propaganda ministry during the war 
where at one stage they reported that the Ark Royal had been sunk and it 
took a very brave official from the German Naval Ministry who was at the 
meeting to say this. Goebbels said ‘Right, we’ve reported the Ark Royal as 
being sunk. Now we know it has not been sunk and we’ve got to back track 
on this, Naval Ministry how do you reply?’ And this is in a transcript I’ve got of 
the meeting and the brave person from the German Navy said ‘Well, I’m 
afraid, Herr Minister, that is your problem, because it was the Propaganda 
Ministry that sank it and not the Navy.’ But during the Falklands War they 
sank, I’m trying to remember I don’t think it was the Ark Royal it might’ve been 
the Invincible, was sunk so many times and the propaganda was so awful. 
 
SO: This is truly global radio wars. 
 
KS: But at the same time at the World Service, a colleague and friend of mine 
Rob Watson - he’s now still a senior BBC correspondent - used to do a BBC 
programme called ‘Call in the Falklands’ that was specifically done for the 
Falkland Islands as it was broadcast nowhere else. It was just presenting 
news of particular interest to them, maybe things that wouldn’t get on to the 
World Service, much more minor things going on in Argentina or Uruguay or 
things going on with Antarctic surveys or something that would be of 
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particular interest to the Falkland Islanders. It was put out, I think, a weekly 
programme called ‘Call in the Falklands’. 
 
SO: Keith, in terms of your other professional outputs, you also wrote for 
Derek Ingram as part of his Gemini news gathering service. 
 
KS: Yes. 
 
SO: Did you get a particular editorial steer from Derek and the particular line 
he was interested in? Was he attentive to how you wrote up a story, 
telling you to tweak it or to alter the slant for a particularly 
Commonwealth audience? 
 
KS: I didn’t particularly get that sort of feedback. He was very meticulous about it 
being accurate and when I sold him the story it tended to be more me 
phoning him to sell him stories, although occasionally he would contact me 
because he knew my particular areas of interest and we would discuss the 
angle. What would be the angle that they wanted on the story? In the same 
way I would think about something I did for the World Service in terms of 
who’s listening to this and what do they want to know. I would never slant a 
story to the extent of missing main points of the story, but you had to think, 
you always think about what does your audience want from this story? What 
do they need to know? What level of knowledge can they presume? So I did a 
wide variety of stories for Derek, I would do a lot, because obviously it wasn’t 
a Commonwealth country. It bordered Commonwealth countries. I would do a 
lot on Angola, which in the ‘80s and ‘90s was one of my specialist areas. So 
the progress of the Angolan War because of the long border with Zambia, the 
closeness to Botswana, so a future and then after 1990 a new 
Commonwealth member country Namibia, the link with South Africa which 
obviously, whilst outside the Commonwealth until 1994, was very much in the 
view of the Commonwealth as an important area. So I would cover Angola, 
the regional balance, I would cover things going on in South Africa. Also 
conservation issues which is another thing I do: important conservation issues 
within Commonwealth areas and those tended to have quite a wide remit. I 
remember seeing things that I’d written on the endangered wild dogs of 
Africa, because Derek was always very good about sending me photocopies 
of where it appeared, for example in a Nepalese newspaper which quite 
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surprised me. But it was always, when I discussed things with him, ‘What is 
going to interest your audience?’ but I never felt there was a tweaking of 
‘You’ve got to give a particular view on this.’ 
 
SO: So it was an editorial steer rather than editorial insistence. 
 
KS: Yes, but really I always felt it was very much the same sort of intrinsic, 
underlying view that I had at the World Service. And I never felt it intrusive or 
pushing me in directions that either wasn’t comfortable or I hadn’t thought of 
going. 
 
SO: So this is a case of Derek then selecting his journalists for contributors 
relatively carefully? 
 
KS: I suspect and I’m trying to remember how I first got in touch with him and I 
rather suspect it was through Colin Legum who I knew well and who I’d been, 
you could say in a gentle way, I was headhunted for. Because when I was 
originally doing my research on Southern Africa and the Soviet Union one 
publication that I used was one called USSR and the Third World, strangely 
produced by an organisation called the Central Asian Research Centre, now 
unfortunately defunct, run by somebody who had previously been at 
Monitoring many years before me called David Morrison, who was an expert 
on, not just Central Asia, but particularly also on the Soviet Union, China and 
the developing world. David Morrison produced a digest that included 
monitoring output but included Soviet press output that he translated himself 
on the Soviet Union and the Third World and I’d met him. I actually became 
company secretary of the Central Asian Research Centre for a while and 
when I was going out to Malawi to work for BBC Monitoring, Malawi was a no 
go area for western journalists. Kamuzu Banda did not like western 
journalists. He kicked out all the western journalists and he was very, very 
tight on ever letting them in. 
 
SO: Had there been critical reporting? 
 
KS: Oh yes. Yes and then the critical book about him by a chap who later became 
somebody I worked with a lot was a very good BBC China correspondent but 
had worked in Malawi and I think was actually editor of the Daily Times in 
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Malawi in the run up to independence. That’s Philip Short and Philip had 
written a very good book called Banda, all about Banda and he brought out all 
sorts of things that the [unclear 1.03.53] Banda did not like. After he left and 
after there being various other reports that Banda found distasteful, he just 
stopped journalists going there. So there were no western journalists resident 
in Malawi. When I was going out there David Morrison wrote for Colin 
Legum’s Africa Contemporary Record. He wrote, I think, the Soviet Union and 
Africa and the China and Africa sections and he suggested to Colin that I go 
to see him before I went out and that I maybe wrote the Malawi chapter when 
I came back from Malawi, because I was going to be out there, I would 
actually get a feel for things. I couldn’t under my BBC contract report from 
Malawi from anyone else while I was out there and had I tried to do so I think I 
would’ve been deported straightaway. 
 
But there was no problem from the BBC viewpoint of me writing, if you like, an 
academic style article for Africa Contemporary Record. So I gathered the 
material and I then started writing the Malawi chapter, I got permission from 
Monitoring to do it on Malawi. I wrote the Malawi chapter for the Africa 
Contemporary Record, I think, for about the next eight years and then also a 
couple of years after I started writing the China and Africa section on Malawi. 
So I think it was Colin, because Colin then liking the stuff that I wrote on 
Malawi and my style of writing, he gave the introductions to various people.  
For example, he gave me introductions to Sean Moroney, who was then 
editor of African Business who then gave me introductions to Alan Rake who 
was editor of New African, both of which are still published, although Sean 
and Alan had now moved on and I think he also probably gave me an 
introduction to Derek. 
 
SO: This is very much a Commonwealth journalist network. 
 
KS: Yes, very much. 
 
SO: You also became a member of the editorial board of the Anti-Apartheid 
News. 
 
KS: Because again, I’d always, as I mentioned, been very interested in South 
Africa, very effected just by hearing that news of the Soweto uprising and 
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seeing the pictures and in fact I was describing this to my students at Kent the 
other day talking about journalism and covering major events. I still almost get 
a lump in the throat when I talk about it, having seen that picture of the dead 
boy, Hector Peterson, on the first day of the Soweto uprising and the killings 
of school children by the South African police, I broadcast live next to his 
grave on the morning that the polls opened in South Africa with a queue 
stretching back miles in the cold, early morning of Johannesburg: a queue 
miles long of people waiting to vote at the polling station right next to his 
grave and interview people live in the queue as they waited for the polling 
station to open at seven o’clock. But yes, I was very, very interested and my 
time in Malawi, then going to Zimbabwe. I didn’t go on to South Africa on that 
occasion. When I came back I started writing a lot and again I can’t remember 
the connection, but I was beginning to look at various aspects of British 
military relations with South Africa, not official government relations but the 
way perhaps that British military technology could still, in ways, be passed to 
South Africa despite the suspension of arms’ sales, arms’ embargoes and in 
order to do the research I went up to the offices of IDAF. And there I met 
Margaret Ling, who was the editor of Anti-Apartheid News and she helped me 
with a piece of research I was doing and then said: “would you be prepared to 
write this research up for Anti-Apartheid News?”  So I did, but the time my 
name didn’t go out on air at the BBC because I was still at Monitoring. 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
KS: This was not a problem for the BBC because I couldn’t be linked directly to 
the BBC. 
 
SO: So did you know of people such as Abdul Minty? 
 
KS: Yes, and Mike Terry, people in London from the ANC, from the SACP, yes 
and then from basically I think from ’82 or ’83, it was certainly late ’82 at the 
earliest I then started writing regularly for Anti-Apartheid News. Then in ’84, I 
think it was, or possibly ’85 I was asked to become a member of the editorial 
board. So I used to come up once a month to Selous Street, very odd name 
really, I think it was Selous Street. 
 
SO: I’m sorry, that is ironic! 
26 
 
 
KS: Yes, to Anti-Apartheid headquarters for the monthly editorial meeting with 
people like Mike Terry, Margaret, Alan Brooks, Karen Allen I think was also a 
member who then I think may still be with AAM Elaine Unterhalter, various 
other people. We would plan and often have an ANC representative there, 
planning output and I wrote every single month for about I think up to 1988 
when I moved up to the Word Service and my name started going out. At that 
point I would still write things but it usually went out without my name or 
actually under an assumed name. 
 
SO: As you say South Africa was a very important area for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
KS: Yes. 
 
SO: At this time. So did you report on the visit of the Eminent Person’s 
Group, for Anti-Apartheid News? 
 
KS: Yes. And I reported things like Commonwealth reactions to the Mazeru attack 
and to suspected and actual South African support for dissidence in 
Zimbabwe, for example. I’m trying to think of other things I remember. The 
assassination of Ruth First. I never knew Ruth, but I knew Joe and 
interviewed him on a number of occasions and things like that. I’d cover 
things like that for Anti-Apartheid News and because I knew all the sources at 
Monitoring and when I was at Monitoring and then at the BBC, I could also 
not only see what was published but I could see what didn’t get published, not 
censored out, but things just because there wasn’t room and the BBC didn’t 
have the money to publish everything in the SWB. I would also see lots of 
radio transcripts, lots of reports that just didn’t get to air and I could use them 
because it was basically once you’d read it, it was open source intellectual 
property. It wasn’t anything hidden or secret. So I had a lot of very interesting 
information that I could feed into both what I wrote for the BBC, what I wrote 
as a freelance and then what I wrote for the Anti-Apartheid News. 
 
SO: Keith, just to draw together the threads of the discussion so far then, 
where would you position the BBC in the ‘how has the Commonwealth 
survived and why it’s survived?’ 
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KS: It’s very difficult. I think in a lot of ways, it’s because of this unspoken empathy 
and the fact that coverage of events in Commonwealth countries whether 
critical or just purely informative, creates a link. It creates voices and the way 
that people in Commonwealth countries would view the World Service as 
something they didn’t always agree with, they didn’t always like, leaders 
would be critical of it, people would be critical of it on the ground but on the 
whole they felt that it was telling them broadly the truth. 
 
SO: How much did the BBC help and does it still help, in your view, make 
the Commonwealth the people’s Commonwealth, rather than the elite 
actors, rather than the professional organisations, so actually the 
Commonwealth has relevance in terms of connectivity to the everyday? 
 
KS: Because it goes into people’s homes. I mean it is again why I think radio, in 
particular, but also the BBC in terms of its website, the fact that it has specific 
Africa website, it has African output not just in English but in Swahili and 
Hausa, for example, but it gets into people’s homes so it’s not something 
mediated through their governments. It gets into their homes. I think sadly the 
way the BBC is changing due to financial pressure means that it gets to fewer 
people than it used to and it is more susceptible to be interrupted than it used 
to and the way it looks at its audience is different. We always knew that part 
of our audience was an elite and that most of our audience would be, say, in 
the top 10 per cent in education and probably earning terms in most of the 
countries we broadcast in. But we all had a belief that we weren’t just 
broadcasting to them. I think every single person I worked with had this belief 
or this hope. Maybe it was a false hope, this hope we were broadcasting to 
ordinary people. We were broadcasting to everyone. We were not an elitist 
organisation. But gradually over the years as BBC World Service financing 
has dropped and you couldn’t afford the broadcast as much as you used to, 
even when I was there they were beginning to talk when you had senior 
figures, we would have planning meetings and I got to the stage where I was 
running groups of programmes. At one stage I was effectively managing 
editor of the World Service news room and I was part of planning for the 
future. By the time, I think, Mark Byford took over there was much more a 
view, and I remember these terms being used that we now move to where our 
primary audiences around the world were what they called metropolitans and 
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cosmopolitans. So it was more educated, perhaps more active in, you could 
call, the globalised sectors of economies, in audiences. 
 
SO: It slightly smacks at the chattering classes. 
 
KS: Yes. Yes it does. We are broadcasting to the metropolitans and particular to 
the cosmopolitans, those within those classes that travel, had international 
links, the decision makers, the movers and shakers, the people who can 
influence things instead of what we all wanted. We fought against it tooth and 
nail and I think the point where it moved too far was a couple of years ago. I 
can’t remember the date, I should do because I actually organised and wrote 
a submission to the sub-committee of the House of Commons, the Foreign 
Affairs Sub-Committee and you can find it online, a paper on and contributed 
to by a lot of former World Service people on the problems of the changes in 
broadcasting to Africa and how this would cut out a lot of the value that had 
been there in reaching a wider audience and particularly decisions, for 
example. I can understand why they did it from a technical point of view, but I 
think from a reaching an audience point of view, if you like, an inclusiveness 
point of view, it was disastrous, is to cut out a lot of shortwave broadcasts and 
to rely on FM and this made it interruptable. 
 
KS: Take Rwanda, once you stopped broadcasting on shortwave and you relied 
on FM relay stations in Kigali or Ruhungeri or wherever it could be stopped 
and it was. So the last Rwandan election, not that long before the election, 
Kinyarwanda broadcasts started by the BBC as a sort of lifeline service and 
then continued as an important service to the people of Rwanda who had 
suffered so much from the … no other way of putting it … the evils of their 
broadcasting system before and during the genocide. This was a service that 
would tell them what was going on. When it was stopped on shortwave and 
went on to FM, the Kagame government stopped it when it wanted to. So 
suddenly nations would broadcast a piece on to nation unless the local FM re-
broadcast it and decide they didn’t want to hear it and they could cut it off as 
they did for several months. 
 
SO: But actually this is tied into the Latimer House principles of supporting 
the three pillars of democratic governments. 
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KS: Yes and as soon as you stop having control over your means of broadcasting 
and your audience means of receiving, you’ve handed over control to 
somebody else and can be easily interrupted. You’d have thought the BBC 
would’ve learnt by its monumental and stupid cock up over BBC Arabic 
television when it was first launched. On the editorial side it was purely and 
absolutely independent, but its satellite provider was partly owned by the 
members of the Saudi royal family and relatively soon after it started 
broadcasting it broadcast something concerning Saudi Arabia. I can’t 
remember if it was ‘the Death of the Princess’ or something else, but it was 
something the Saudis didn’t like, they pulled the plug. Satellite went down as 
far as the BBC was concerned, BBC could not be seen in Saudi Arabia. 
 
SO: What then in your view has been the role of BBC World TV? I mean you 
emphasise the particular importance of radio. 
 
KS: I mean in some areas of the world like the Indian sub-continent, for example, 
where TV audiences grew massively and began to replace radio audiences, 
then BBC World TV became very important. 
 
SO: So does the journalistic team of BBC World Radio in any way feed into 
BBC World TV? 
 
KS: I think it does now, but it didn’t used to. They were in two separate buildings 
and although BBC World Service people moved over a lot of them to World 
TV, there wasn’t quite the same … there wasn’t a very, very regular contact 
between us. 
 
SO: They are two very different media. 
 
KS: Yes and it was much more governed obviously by pictures, so whereas we 
could cover an event in quite a lot of detail say in a country … I’m just trying 
to think off my head. If something happened in Rwanda, we could cover that, 
we could get voices from there. TV really doesn’t like covering things if you 
can get their pictures. So it might not always be covered for that reason. I’ve 
always been, although I watch TV and watch quite a reasonable amount of 
TV news partly so I can criticise it … talking to my wife, she actually said last 
night: “I would like to hear what Jon Snow is saying, not just what you think 
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about what Jon Snow is saying”. So I argue with the television and the radio 
all the time, but I think TV coverage by its very nature has to be less inclusive, 
has to be less comprehensive because they want pictures, you want pictures, 
unless it’s a huge event and you can get your correspondent in the studio or 
you can at least get a picture of your correspondent and their voice or maybe 
a Skype scratchy thing up of them. You want pictures or you don’t really cover 
it. 
 
SO: Commonwealth audiences are changing, the way the Commonwealth 
consumes news is changing. 
 
KS: Yes, oh it is. It is, but I think the BBC is almost making it change in terms of its 
consumption of the BBC by cutting out certain things. So, for example, if you 
are in a rural area of Ghana, you may not now get the BBC as you used to 
because it will be re-broadcast on FM and FM has not got the same range as 
shortwave, so you may not get it any longer. But it is cheaper and easier and 
when it does get to people it is in better sound quality and it’s the way to go 
and there’s almost, I would say, this fetish of technological advance that that 
overcomes what I think should be the focus of what audience you’re trying to 
reach and then differences of opinion over what your audience is and maybe 
I’m very old fashioned about it, maybe I’m much more, how can one put it. 
 
SO: A word-smith? 
 
KS: No not particularly that. In my outlook I make no bones about it, I am very 
much to the left and I do not believe that media should just be there for the 
elite; I think media should be there for everybody and in a format and in ways 
that everyone can reach. 
 
SO: Keith, on that note, thank you very much indeed.  I’m going to stop it 
there. 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
